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EGO, SELF, AND THE BODY.
AN ASSESSMENT OF DOOYEWEERD'S
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
GERUIT GLAS*
l. Summary and introduction
This contribution starts with a re-appraisal of some elements of Dooye-
weerd's philosophical anthropology. I draw attention to Dooyeweerd's
view of the body as an enkaptic structural whole. After a brief exposition
of this view I mention two points which seem to me most valuable in
relation to the special sciences: Dooyeweerd's conceptualization of the so-
called sub-structures of the body and his notion of object-functions.
I then turn to the concept of the ego. I discuss this concept by con-
fronting Dooyeweerd's view of the ego with some well-known criticisms
of the concept of the ego in traditional philosophy of consciousness. I
mention three problems, and argue that transcendental philosophy, in
particular in the versions of Kant and Husserl, can only evade these
problems by calling into existence another one, namely, how to
combine the general notion of a pure, transcendental consciousness with
a view on the ego as personal, self-concerned and committed. Dooye-
weerd's transcendental approach offers a solution to the three problems of
traditional philosophy of consciousness, but his approach does not
adequately address the difficulty of combining the transcendental and
the personal. This inadequacy is explained, partly, by the dominance of
the metaphor of the I as a center. My suggestion is that by rethinking the
I even more thoroughly than Dooyeweerd did from a relational point of
view, we can avoid this dilemma and offer a more suitable approach to
the understanding of personhood.
In the final part, I broaden my view to some adjacent areas and
inspect some of the issues which seem particularly interesting and in
need of future investigations.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to A. Tol for his suggestions to
improve the English of this contribution.
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2. Dooyeweerd: the body as cnkaptic structural whole
Dooyeweerd has never published as extensively on anthropology as
he did on cosmology, epistemology and social philosophy. The third
volume of Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, which was
announced already in 1949 (Dooyeweerd 1949, 13), never appeared. The
unpublished draft of this volume adds little that is fundamentally new,
as compared to the better known 32 propositions (1942), the article of 1961
and Dooyeweerd's remarks in the third Volume of A New Critique of
Theoretical Thought (NC III, 87-90, 776-784) and In the Twilight of Western
Thought (1960s; cf. Ouweneel 1986).
This certainly does not mean that Dooyeweerd was not interested in
philosophical anthropology or considered it as unimportant. On the
contrary, at the end of the third volume of A New Critique he explicitly
states that all his investigations were "nothing but a necessary prepara-
tion" for this "most important problem of philosophy" (JVC III, 781).
Notwithstanding the scarcity of the published material, what Dooye-
weerd did write has proven to be stimulating. What seems to be
particularly interesting is his idea of the human body as an enkaptic
structural whole. This whole consists of a "form-totality" involving four
part- or sub-structures, i.e. the physical, the biotic, the psychic, and the
act-structure. These sub-structures are hierarchically bound together, viz.
the physical is bound up into the biotic, the biotic into the psychic, and
the psychic into the act-structure. The term body does not, in this context,
refer only to the physical and biotic sub-structures, but to the totality of
man's temporal existence. This is one of the ways in which Dooyeweerd
expresses his opposition to mind-body dualism.
There are two features of this theory which seem to me particularly
interesting. The first of these is the conceptual status of the sub-structures.
Dooyeweerd's view is subtle, for he rejects two possible interpretations of
the enkaptic structural whole. As an enkaptic structural whole, the
human body should be considered neither as an aggregate of indepen-
dent sub-structures, nor as consisting of parts which are dissolved into a
larger whole, like the part-whole relation of Gerfaft-psychology. That is to
say, the part-structures keep their own structure, which can be analyzed
along the lines of Dooyeweerd's theory of the structure of individuality.
However, they are not independent constituents, but integrated into a
"form-totality embracing all the interwoven structures in a real enkaptic
unity" (NC III, 695). In the analysis of this integrated totality the whole
richness of distinctions returns — a feature which is characteristic of
Dooyeweerd's theory of individuality structures.
The second important feature of Dooyeweerd's anthropology concerns
the application of the theory of individuality structures to the human
body, in particular the application of the notion of object functions. This
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notion enables one to conceptualize, for instance, the inner coherence of
mental and bodily functioning. The easiest way to make this clear is by
borrowing an example from everyday experience, for instance the
functioning of a chair. The chair has subject-functions up to (and
including) the physical aspect. However, its functioning as a chair is
determined by its social object-function. People use chairs to sit on, in
order to work or to spend their leisure time. Assuming that these
functions can be qualified as social, chairs can be said to possess a social
object-function as qualifying function. The important thing to note, here,
is that this social function is a property of the chair itself; moreover, that
this function is expressed in and by means of the physical structure of the
chair. In other words, the chair's social function is not something
external to it. It is not a more or less arbitrary property. It is intrinsically
linked to the physical properties of the chair. The organization of the
physical material is determined by the social function of the chair.
The same holds with respect to the human body and its organs, for
instance, the human brain. The brain is an organ which functions
subjectively — i.e. actively — in the physical and in the biotic sub-
structure. Its object-functions are determined by the psychic sub-structure
and the act-structure. These object-functions belong to the brain, just as
the social object-function belongs to the chair. They are functions of the
brain, which are expressed in and by means of the brain as a biotically
qualified structure. Accordingly, thinking and feeling are not activities
which are arbitrarily and externally linked to the brain. On the con-
trary, the organization of the brain as a biologically functioning organ is
intrinsically determined by these activities. Dooyeweerd's theory of the
body discards both the anthropomorphizing of the activities of the brain
— as if it were the brain itself which feels, thinks, and so on — as well as
a view of mental activities, which transforms them into ghost-like, dis-
embodied phenomena, which are only accidentally related to the brain.
In this way both biologistic reductionism and mind-body dualism are
rejected. One could add that this does not imply that Dooyeweerd's
anthropology should be interpreted as a variant of the psychophysical
identity theory. The sphere-sovereignty of the qualifying functions of
the sub-structures cannot be reconciled with the idea of intra-systemic
isomorphism, which is typical of identity theory.
In my opinion, Dooyeweerd's theory of the enkaptic structural whole,
in particular when seen from the perspective of his general theory of
individuality structures, has a great heuristic and conceptual potential
which may enrich philosophical discussions within the special sci-
ences. It can, for instance, fruitfully be applied to problems as different as
that of the use and the limitations of the computer analogy in cognitive
science, the application of animal models in psychopharmacological
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research, the role of DNA in the developing organism and the integra-
tion of psychotherapy and faith, — to mention only a few possibilities.
3. Docyeweerd: the ego as spiritual center
I shall now focus on the I or ego, and the relation between the I and the
self. Dooyeweerd's philosophy has much to say about the ego (or
"selfhood", which is a translation of the Dutch "zelf-heid"). Most notable
is his idea of the "concentration of functions". Human selfhood, in
Dooyeweerd's view, is the concentric directedness of the totality of a
person's existence toward the Origin of meaning. The similarity be-
tween this definition and the definition of religion is striking.1 Indeed,
Dooyeweerd repeatedly speaks of the ego as a religious concept (or: idea).
Human selfhood in its deepest sense is religiously determined. This also
explains the dynamic nature of the self. The self brings together the
totality of our existence and directs this totality to God. The self is
characterized by an urge towards the transcendent.
This implies that the self cannot be located in one of the modal
functions or be identified with one of the sub-structures, for instance the
act-structure. Neither can the self be seen as a hidden substance — say,
the kind of identity David Hume ironically was looking for in his
Treatise on Human Nature (Book I, Part 4, section vi). The Dooyeweerdian
view of the self is neither hierarchical, nor substantialist, nor dualist,
although there are some remnants of a hierarchical view on account of
Dooyeweerd's view on the body as enkaptic structural whole (Dengerink
1986, 332ff.; 1989; Glas 1989; 1992; Troost 1989).
Dooyeweerd's view of the ego has been seriously criticized from
several sides, in particular with respect to the so-called supra-temporality
of the heart as "the spiritual root of all the temporal manifestations of our
life" (Dooyeweerd 1960, 186). I don't want to re-open this discussion here,
because, in my opinion, it has already dominated the discussion on
Reformational anthropology too much, and because, at this stage, it could
easily lead to philosophical sterility (for a review cf. for example
Ouweneel 1986; 1989b; Blosser 1993). I agree with some of the criticisms
pertaining to the notion of supra-temporality and the doctrine of time
which is related to this notion, in particular with the critique which
rejects the association between temporality and diversity on the one
hand, and supratemporality and unity on the other hand (Geertsema
1970; 1993; Brûggeman-Kruijff 1981; 1982). However, I do not think, as
some critics do, that Dooyeweerd can be accused of dualism, as if in his
view the supratemporal ego could in some way be separated from man's
temporal bodily existence. Dooyeweerd's terminology is predominantly
that of convergence and divergence, concentration and diversity. When
body and spirit are viewed apart from the doctrine of time, then one
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could say, roughly, that body and spirit are two sides of the same coin,
the body representing the side which is turned to the world, with its
many different functional possibilities, the spirit representing the inner
integration and concentration of functions in their orientation to the
Origin of meaning. This also seems to me the position of Henk Hart
(1984,279-280).
What remains to be examined in this re-interpretation is whether the
concentric directedness should primarily be conceived of as the imme-
diate expression of the central relation to the Origin or should be
analyzed in terms of the structural integration of functions and sub-
structures, i.e. as expression of the anticipatory direction of the opening-
process (cf. Stafleu 1991, who endorses the latter view). In Dooyeweerd
each of these approaches represents an aspect of his view of time. His
doctrine of time in fact can be interpreted as an attempt to integrate both
approaches. However, when this doctrine is abandoned, at least with
respect to the parallelism between supratemporality and unity on the one
hand, and temporality and diversity on the other, it is by no means
evident that the anticipatory direction of the opening-process of sub-
structures must lead to (spiritual) unity; and, inversely, that the founda-
tional, or retrocipatory direction must lead to (bodily) diversity.
A complete discussion of this complex problem is beyond the scope of
this contribution. I shall concentrate here on the relation between the I
and notions such as center, unity, and Origin. I shall examine this
relation from a transcendental point of view, i.e., by exploring Dooye-
weerdian anthropology as an instance of transcendental philosophy. To
make my point clear, I shall first discuss transcendental philosophy in
general, namely as one of the branches of philosophy of consciousness
in the tradition of Descartes. Let us begin with Cartesian consciousness
and then turn to the transcendental approach.
4. Dooyeweerd's transcendental approach
4.1. The ego in traditional philosophy of consciousness
There are at least three related problems with respect to the concept of the
I in traditional philosophy of consciousness.
The first of these is the well-known problem of infinite regress. When
knowledge is seen as the conscious apprehending and ordering of
mental contents, each act of knowing can be said to originate from an I,
or ego, which in its turn can be self-reflectively apprehended. However,
there is no end to this process of self-reflection, because the identification
of the I depends on an act of (self-reflective) knowing, which itself
depends on a self-reflective ego, and so on. The logical priority of the I
in the act of knowing cannot be undone by self-reflection. At the end of
this process, the I has evaporated into a vague, non-personal theoretical
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entity, in which little is retained of the original, characteristic properties
of the ego.
Secondly, and related to the first point, it should be noticed that in the
act of self-reflection the Ï is easily reduced to a quasi-object. However, the
I is not a thing, something with regard to which I may have a detached
attitude. A quasi-objective view of the I cannot do justice to the fact that
people are self-concerned, and that it matters to them who they are.
Charles Taylor is right when he says that the self is constituted by a
framework of essential and normative questions and that our identity is
stamped by our commitments with respect to the good (1989, 27; cf.
also 47).
Thirdly, mention should also be made of the dialectic between me
and the other, a dialectic in which the other appears as an object opposite
to me, to be appropriated, brought under control, and even dominated
reflectively. This act in its turn is mirrored by my becoming an object of
appropriation through the acts of other persons (cf. Hegel 1807, 121-128
on master and slave; Levinas 1974, 144ff.).
Kantian transcendental philosophy indeed partly escapes from these
problems, especially that of infinite regress and of quasi-objectification of
the ego. The "I think", as transcendental unity of apperception, is cer-
tainly not an object, but the condition for every possible act of knowing
(cf. Kant 1787, B 132-140). Kant's transcendental ego should be regarded
as a non- or pre-empirical kind of consciousness, independent of and
logically prior to any experience. One may wonder, however, whether
this ego can be conceived of as personal. It is in fact a highly abstract and
general "idea", devoid of personal properties and commitments. The
same holds for the philosophy of Husserl. Here, the transcendental ego
belongs to — what Husserl calls — the "phenomenological residue",
which remains after the epoche of the empirical world, including the
empirical self (Husserl 1922, I, §§ 57, 80). This pure ego is conceived as
the dynamic principle which is responsible for the construction of the
phenomenal world.
Later developments in existential phenomenology have made it clear
that it is almost impossible to combine a transcendental approach in the
line of Kant and Husserl with a view of the ego as personal, committed
and self-concerned. Jean-Paul Sartre (1936), for instance, has made a
distinction between the ego and transcendental consciousness. He holds
that Kantian and Husserlian transcendental consciousness is non-
personal and general. The ego, on the other hand, should be seen as a
"thing", i.e. as the product of a self-reflective act in which a second-order
kind of consciousness focusses on the perceiving or thinking I. Al-
though the activity-as-such of this self-reflective consciousness is self-
evident, the I is not. For the I is a construction of the thinking mind.
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One could say that in the philosophy of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty
and others, this idea of a uniting, non-personal transcendental conscious-
ness is replaced by the notion of existence as pre-reflexive living/being-
in-the-world. However, in a certain sense the old problem returns here.
For, living/being-in-the-world as such is still conceived as impersonal.
Merleau-Ponty speaks of a blind adhesion to the world, an original
connectedness which precedes the becoming of the subject. Personhood
becomes an achievement in these kinds of philosophy, the ambiguous
result of a lifelong struggle against the anonymity of being.
4.2. Dooyeweerd: the ego as religious unity
Now, returning to the traditional philosophy of consciousness, in particu-
lar to its three pitfalls in the conception of the ego, namely infinite
regress, quasi-objectification, and the overpowering of the other, how
does Reformational philosophy, especially Herman Dooyeweerd's
version of it, relate to these pitfalls?
I think the initial answer must be that Dooyeweerd tries to avoid them
by adopting a religious-transcendental framework. I already pointed to
the concentric dynamic towards the Origin which fulfills such a promi-
nent role in Dooyeweerd's anthropology and, I add, in his second trans-
cendental critique. The adjective religious in the expression "religious-
transcendental framework", is important here. For, the ego or selfhood is
not an abstract transcendental-iogica/ unity, as Dooyeweerd emphasizes
time and again, but a religious unity which articulates self-knowledge in
dependence of knowledge of God (contra 1). Furthermore, the I or self is
not a quasi-object, but should be interpreted from the perspective of man
as the image of God. Our selfhood is "ex-sistent". It is not closed in itself.
It consists of the personal and engaged answer to a prior calling (contra
2). And, finally, our individual selfhood both points to and is rooted in
the spiritual community of mankind. The unity of our existence is both
individual and supra-individual (contra 3) (NC I, 52—60; cf. Ouweneel
1989a).
This short exposition illustrates that Dooyeweerd has been successful
in avoiding the pitfalls of traditional philosophy of consciousness. How-
ever, does this also hold for the dissociation of the ego (or personhood)
from transcendental consciousness, a dissociation which appeared to be
characteristic of the Kantian and Husserlian versions of transcendental
philosophy? One may wonder whether this is the case. Certainly, Dooye-
weerd's emphasis on the transcendental ego as a religious — instead of
logical — unity, a unity in which the fullness of man's temporal exis-
tence is concentrated, takes an important step beyond Kant and Husserl.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that too many matters come together in
Dooyeweerd at this point. What can be questioned in particular, is
74 GERRIT GLAS
whether the concrete and personal nature of man as a religious,
responding being can be adequately dealt with within the context of the
epistemological problem of theoretical synthesis (cf. Geertsema 1992,
130; 1993). In my opinion, it cannot. And, when one tries to do so, this
inevitably leads to a narrowing of one's focus on certain (mainly episte-
mological) questions, at the expense of other issues which are at least as
important within the context of anthropology. Let me illustrate this.
One of the main concerns of transcendental philosophy seems to be to
secure the unity of man. Contemporary anthropological thinking, how-
ever, is occupied with the fragmentation of personhood and with the ten-
sion between the individual and society. The transcendental approach
presupposes the transparency of human self-reflection, whereas in our
time ambiguity, darkness and emptiness seem to be key-words denoting
man's self-experience. The transcendental approach favors all kinds of
highly abstract epistemological reflection, without paving much atten-
tion to the ethical and societal context in which people of our time try to
define who they are. So, there are reasons to suspect whether a trans-
cendental framework is not too limited to do justice to the full range of
issues which are raised by contemporary philosophy and philosophical
anthropology.
On closer examination we may even go a step further, by questioning
the concept of the I in transcendental philosophy from a relational
perspective. The transcendental ego is conceived of as a point, it is a
point-like mental construction, a "punctual self", to borrow a term of
Charles Taylor (1989, 159ff.). One may contrast this conception of the I
with Kierkegaard's dictum about the self in his Sickness unto Death.
According to Kierkegaard, the self is "a relation which relates to itself,
and in relating to itself relates to something else" (1849, 43; cf. Evans
1993). This "something else" is God.
To be sure, Dooyeweerd's account of the I is fully relational. The I is
"nothing in itself", he says; "it is nothing as long as we try to conceive of
it apart from the three central relations, which alone give it meaning"
(Dooyeweerd 1960a, 181). These relations are: the relation to temporal
reality, including the body; the relation to our fellow human beings; and
the relation to God as the Origin of meaning. In this context, Dooye-
weerd even discerns an I-self relation, which is a relation between, what
he calls, our I-ness (supra-temporal heart, spirit) and our body as the
totality of temporal structures.
However, what seems important in this context, is that this I-self
relation is conceptualized as a relation between center and periphery.
The supratemporal heart (center) expresses itself in a multitude of tempo-
ral functions (periphery). In my opinion, it is precisely this metaphor,
which shows some of the limitations of the transcendental framework.
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First of ail, one may argue for a contrary view, namely a conception
of the I as being "eccentric" (cf. Klapwijk 1987). Vollenhoven already
once said, that it is Christ who is the center of our existence, and not we
ourselves (1967, 96). Dooyeweerd has probably been aware of this, as
appears from his reference to the notion of "ex-sistence", and from his
emphasis on the concentric dynamic towards the Origin. However, the
metaphor of the ego as a center seems to obscure the eccentric position of
man in his/her relation to the Origin.
Secondly, there are strong reasons to maintain that the I as such is
relational, i.e., that the I primarily exists as an I-self relation.2 By
conceptualizing the I as relational, much more justice can be done to
Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the dynamic nature of both the I-self relation
and the relation of the self to the Origin and to fellow humans. For this
dynamic itself is relational. I am basically a responding self. By
responding, I become a self. This I-self relation is not a negative unity, as
Kierkegaard calls it, i.e. the passive result of the interaction between
independent relata. It is as such, as a relation, the expression of our rela-
tion to God. The notion of a virtual, transcendental point of concentration
appears to be superfluous as soon as we perceive that the concentrating
force is completely relationally determined. The I-self relation is
deepened and "concentrated" (or intensified, which would be the term
of my predilection), because of its being a relation which relates to (or:
refers to) God.
Besides, this relational view of man also amounts to a re-appraisal of
the term Origin. The relational nature of man seems to mirror the
relational nature of God, as triune Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The unity
of God is not "punctual", but should be conceived of as the expression of
the loving relationship between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
The term Origin certainly reflects one of the biblical pictures of God,
namely God as the fountain of all life. However, this picture should not
one-sidedly dominate anthropology.
Thirdly, Dooyeweerd's metaphor of center and periphery betrays a
bias toward the unity of man. Again, the reasons for this bias are still
valid. By interpreting the dynamic of self-reflective consciousness as a
religious dynamic, Dooyeweerd tries to show both the disintegrating
tendency of absolutized theoretical thought and the unifying (and con-
centrating) power of the biblical religious groundmotive. This inner
critique of the Enlightenment project is still of great importance (cf.
Habermas 1985, 31). Even Dooyeweerd's at first sight rather confusing
qualification of the transcendental ego as pointing to a unity which is
both individual and supra-individual, can be appreciated as a deep and
important insight, namely as a recognition of the fact that our identity
cannot be divorced from a community, a community whose spiritual
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unity is determined by creation, fall and redemption. The "one-ness" of
this community is dependent upon the divine Origin and warranted by
the spiritual unity of its members longing for their redemption in Christ.
Dooyeweerd would certainly agree that personhood is a relational
category, which derives its meaning from a web of interpersonal rela-
tions. Personhood reveals its deepest meaning, when these relations are
opened up by and directed to the spiritual community with God.
However, here anew we see how this thoroughly relational view is
partially obscured by the transcendental framework. Unity, as transcen-
dental idea, i.e. as virtual point of convergence, cannot simply be equated
with (concrete) community. Being one with others in a spiritual com-
munity denotes only one of the aspects of personhood. Taking part in a
spiritual community also means recognizing the other-ness of the other.
Difference (and separate-ness) is just as fundamental to personhood as
one-ness. The bias toward unity seems to detract from the many-colored
diversity of relations, particularly the diversity of I-thou relations. Rather
than as a transcendental unity, the I should be seen as a many-facetted
responding agent in a network of relations, the I-self relation included.
5. Suggestions
One of the important challenges of a Christian approach to philosophical
anthropology is to keep together the two aspects, which were so closely
tied together in the work of Herman Dooyeweerd, namely the structural
analysis of reality and the inner critique of all kinds of theories and the
philosophies and worldviews on which these theories are based. In our
time, it is tempting to split up philosophical anthropology (and philo-
sophy in general) and to separate those two aspects. Academic profi-
ciency in the philosophy of one of the special sciences then easily looses
its critical, religiously determined sharpness; whereas the analysis of
the worldviews behind the images of our age easily transforms into a
kind of evaluative impressionism, or, even worse, structureless mora-
lism. However, "structure" and "direction" should be kept together. That
is the important task of Christian philosophical anthropology at the close
of the twentieth century.
To conclude, I will mention four points which, at least to me, appear as
particularly interesting for the near future (other preferences are
welcome too, see Stafleu 1991).
First, there is need for a further development of Dooyeweerd's
systematic philosophy, especially in relation to the special sciences. For
instance, in the context of philosophical anthropology a more detailed
account of personal identity is called for. The concept of identity is
confusing and multi-layered. One can discern many types of personal
identity, not only numerical and qualitative, as Parfit suggests (1984,
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201ff.; for a comment cf, Plantinga 1993, 48-57), but also psychic, social,
legal, moral and/or religious. Christians often wrongly associate per-
sonal identity with what (or who) survives death. They are tempted to
equate their spiritual existence after death with certain kinds of mental
activity before death. Perhaps, a naive reading of the first chapters of the
book of Genesis plays a role here, as if man's creation consists of an
almost mechanical putting together of a mind-substance and a body-
substance. Certainly, there is a parallelism between creation and death
in the biblical teaching. However, just as God's acts in the creation of
man cannot be reconstructed, so the dissolution of mind and body in
death cannot be theoretically conceptualized, at least not in the sense that
certain faculties of the mind remain untouched by death. Ultimately,
death is a miracle, a boundary of our understanding.
With respect to the concept of identity, there remain deep and difficult
questions (for an introduction cf. Strawson 1959; Glover 1988; Cassam
1994; Wilkes 1988). Identity is a concept with two sides, a structural and
an individual (or particular) side. Dooyeweerd has said a lot about the
structural side; however, he has never given a satisfactory account of the
individual side. Here I see a relation between the longing for such an
account and the reviving of discussions about the concept of substance
(Evans 1993; Blosser 1993; cf. also Strawson 1959, 87-116). At the same
time, I also see possibilities for the relational perspective, in particular in
a philosophical re-thinking of research in developmental psychology
and some schools of psychotherapy (Olihuis 1993).
Secondly, there is the challenge of the fast and fascinating develop-
ments in the special sciences. In the current "decade of the brain" there
is of course the challenge of the neurosciences. I do not mean here the
thought experiments which for some time have been so popular among
philosophers (cf. Dennett 1981; 1991; Hofstadter and Dennett 1981;
Wilkes 1988), but the tough and time-consuming research in sciences
like molecular biology, neurophysiology and neurobiology and the
philosophical reflections on this research and, among other things, the
ensuing critique regarding folk-psychology (Churchland 1986; cf. also
Hundert 1989).
Thirdly, there is the challenge of our plural, post-Nietzschean, and
postmodern society. After the death of God, and in the aftermath of
Nietzsche, who asks who has wiped out the horizon behind which God
was supposed to exist, there remains an emptiness which is both wished
for and aching, like a persistent stomach-ache, according to Bataille
(1954). The self both wants to be "the" whole, in a kind of mega-process
of merging with the object, with others; and he/she is idle, without roots,
and at the edge of nothingness. We may encounter here both extreme
forms of subjectivism and of objectivism. In the inner critique of, and the
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discussion with, postmodernism, the possibility of absolute contingency
should, in my opinion, be questioned (Glas 1993). Absolute individuality
ends in chaos, and it should be doubted whether absolute chaos is even
thinkable.
Finally, with respect to the challenge of Jewish and early-Christian
thinking, much can be learned from the sensitivity to the Transcendent
in a thinker like A.J. Heschel (1966), to say nothing of the penetrating
critique of E. Levinas of Western philosophy as a totalitarian thinking of
the self as same-ness. Man is a being, who is in search of meaning. But
man's longing is empty if its fulfillment, i.e. God, cannot relate to
him/her. Man's search of meaning is meaningful because of God's
search of man. For our thinking this kind of reversal — which implies a
conversion — will remain of lasting importance.
Footnotes
1
 This definition reads: "... the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself
toward the true or toward a pretended absolute Origin of all temporal diversity of
meaning, which it finds focused concentrically in itself" (NC\, 57).
2
 This expression ("exists as an I-self relation") should be read as a pregnant
manner of saying that the I is not something with an existence-in-itself, distinct
from the relations in which it is involved. Certainly, relations are relations of
something; and properties are properties of something. But this "something" does
not exist as such, in itself, completely independent of its relations and properties. Its
existence, the nature of this "something", can only be expressed in terms of these
relations and properties.
This does not imply a view in which our universe is inhabited by relations only
and in which there is no room for entities. And it also does not imply the kind of
actualism which, for instance, comes to the surface in the work of Kierkegaard. The
difficulty which seems to arise here, can be attributed to our inclination to separate
substance from function (or: property), or, in other words, to separate relations from
the bearer» of these relations. This inclination easily leads to a conception of the 1
in which the I is something with a real or hypothesized existence-in-itself, apart
from ils relations. Reformational philosophy, in the versions of Dooyeweerd and
Vollenhoven, has always rejected this kind of substantializing (or reification).
Moreover and more importantly, it has emphasized that the concept of substance as
such can only emerge within the horizon of theoretical thought Reality exists as
being subject to the law. This "being subject" is the common denominator of reality,
I realize that a lot more is at stake here. What has been said until now does not
provide an answer to the question whether a non-substantialist concept of substance
would be possible, i.e. a concept of substance in which the (epistemic) distinction
between substance and function (property) does not lead to an (ontic) separation of
these two. Or, in other words, is there really no concept, or notion, of substance
outside the realm of theoretical thinking? Cf. my remark on identity and indivi-
duality in the fifth section.
SELF AS QUESTION:
A RESPONSE TO GERRIT GLAS
HENDRIK HART
I
My experience of "self" as I prepared this response to Glas's "A Christian
Assessment of Philosophical Anthropology" was dominated by a young
friend's struggle with death.1 Against that background — as well as
others I will not mention — , I'd like to begin by confessing that, as far as
I can tell in our time, the truth about our-selves is not adequately statable
in philosophy or philosophical anthropology; whether that truth, philo-
sophy-like, is a statement that tells it as it is, or whether, as in the Bible,
truth is a disclosure in which we can find a home for our-selves. So I seek
an approach to philosophical anthropology from outside of it, i.e., from
our own explicit awareness of people, from a iri/conscious position with-
in what Dooyeweerd called naive experience, which he saw as basic for
theory. In that awareness of people I include my own experience of
myself and others, but also their experience of self and others. If philo-
sophical anthropology is to contribute to our being people, then its reality
ought to include, I believe, the reality of Nicholas Wolterstorffs (1987)
Lament for a Son. It needs to make space for what the Dutch poet-theo-
logian Okke Jager poetically referred to as the precious vulnerability of
our spiritually broken and confused sisters and brothers.2 I trust that as
Christian philosophers at the end of the second millenium we are
humbled by the philosophical legacy of Man, the view of oui-selves
strongly and abstractly shaped by a powerful, rational/moral, white,
male, heterosexual, control-and-order oriented point of view. Philosophi-
cal anthropology has not been terribly helpful for blacks, women, people
with different sexual orientation, the poor, the vulnerable; or even for
valuable dimensions of the Man of Reason's own experience.
It could be helpful, if only for a moment, to consider the question: Can
there ever be a general (universal) science (theory, philosophy) of the
human? Can we imagine this in our time, knowing what we know
today? Charles Taylor (1989) offers long lines, broad frameworks, inclu-
sive concepts, and integrative frameworks that could contribute to who
we should be. But do we look for a full, systematic, coherent, universal
theory of human nature, of the essentially and immutably human?
